Vox Meditantis

Before we descend into the philosophical trenches, let’s be clear: the debate between moral realists and anti-realists isn’t just academic posturing. It strikes at the very heart of how we justify our moral convictions. Is our disgust at inequality merely an emotional reaction dressed up in fancy language, or are we perceiving something objectively wrong in the fabric of reality itself? The answer shapes not just philosophy, but our entire approach to social justice.

The Metaethical Terrain: Beyond Right and Wrong

Metaethics isn’t concerned with whether abortion is right or capital punishment is wrong. Rather, it asks what we’re actually doing when we make such claims. Are we describing objective features of the world, expressing feelings, issuing commands, or perpetuating a mass delusion?

As the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy puts it, “Whereas the fields of applied ethics and normative theory focus on what is moral, metaethics focuses on what morality itself is”^[1]. It’s philosophy stepping back to examine the very foundations of moral discourse.

The battlefield is divided into two main camps: moral realists who believe objective moral truths exist independent of human opinion, and anti-realists who deny such objective moral reality. But make no mistake—this isn’t merely a dispute about language. It’s about whether moral claims can stand on solid ground or are built on philosophical quicksand.

Moral Realism: The Quest for Objective Goodness

Moral realists make a bold claim: there are objective moral truths that don’t depend on what any individual or culture happens to think. When we say “torturing children for fun is wrong,” we’re not merely expressing our disapproval—we’re identifying an objective moral fact.

As Study Rocket explains, moral realism “postulates the existence of objective moral values and duties” and “rejects subjectivism, asserting instead that ethics are mind-independent, rather than purely existing as constructs”^[2].

Two main varieties of moral realism dominate the field:

Ethical naturalists argue that moral properties can be reduced to natural properties—things we can study scientifically. For example, John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism suggests that what makes actions right is their tendency to produce happiness, a natural state that can be observed^[7].

But doesn’t this reduction feel inadequate? When we say “genocide is wrong,” are we really just saying “genocide causes suffering”? G.E. Moore thought not, and his open-question argument exposed a problem: for any natural property X proposed as equivalent to “goodness,” we can always sensibly ask, “But is X good?”^[9]. This suggests moral properties aren’t identical to natural ones.

Ethical non-naturalists like Moore take a different approach. They claim moral properties are “non-natural” but still objective—not supernatural, but not reducible to physical properties either^[8]. “Goodness is a simple, undefinable, non-natural property,” insisted Moore. This position maintains moral objectivity without reducing ethics to science.

But can we really believe in mysterious non-natural properties floating about in reality? The moral realist’s quest for objectivity comes at a philosophical price. How do we access these moral facts? Through some special moral perception? And why would these peculiar properties have automatic authority over our actions?

Moral Anti-Realism: Unmasking the Moral Facade

Anti-realists look at the realist’s metaphysical commitments and cry foul. J.L. Mackie’s error theory, perhaps the most confrontational anti-realist position, claims that all our moral judgements are systematically false^[11]. They presuppose objective values that simply don’t exist.

Mackie offers two powerful arguments: The Argument from Disagreement points to persistent moral disagreement across cultures. If objective moral facts existed, shouldn’t we expect more convergence? The Argument from Queerness suggests that objective moral properties would be metaphysically bizarre—unlike anything else in the universe^[14].

Other anti-realists take less drastic approaches. Emotivists claim moral judgements express attitudes rather than beliefs. When I say “Murder is wrong,” I’m essentially saying “Boo to murder!” This isn’t true or false any more than “Hooray for Manchester United!” is true or false^[5].

Prescriptivists like R.M. Hare maintain that moral language is more like giving commands than describing reality. Moral statements tell people what to do rather than how things are^[6].

The common thread? Anti-realists deny that moral statements refer to objective moral facts. Our moral discourse is doing something else entirely—expressing attitudes, issuing commands, or making claims that systematically fail to correspond to reality.

The Real Stakes: Beyond Philosophy Seminars

Why should anyone outside philosophy departments care about this debate? Because it strikes at how we justify our moral convictions.

If moral realism is correct, then when conservatives and progressives argue about justice, at least one side is objectively wrong—regardless of what anyone believes. Moral truth exists independent of our attitudes, cultures, or political systems.

But if anti-realism is correct, then moral disagreements take on a different character. We’re not disagreeing about facts but expressing conflicting attitudes or prescriptions. The debate becomes not about discovering truth but about whose attitudes will prevail.

The disturbing question for progressives: If there are no objective moral facts, on what basis do we condemn injustice? Can we consistently maintain that exploitation and discrimination are really wrong, not just contrary to our preferences?

The Social Democratic Perspective

Here’s where the rubber meets the road. If we care about social justice, can we afford to be anti-realists? When we say “inequality is unjust,” are we merely expressing our dislike of inequality? That seems an inadequate foundation for social democracy.

Yet the moral realist’s metaphysics can seem equally unsatisfying. Do we really need to posit strange non-natural properties to justify our commitment to fairness? Must we claim access to moral truths beyond empirical investigation?

Perhaps we can chart a middle course. Philippa Foot suggested that moral facts might be objective without being strange or mysterious—they’re facts about what humans need to flourish, given the kind of creatures we are. This “neo-Aristotelian naturalism” offers objectivity without metaphysical excess.

Or perhaps we should embrace pragmatism: what matters isn’t whether moral facts exist “out there” but whether treating morality as objective helps us create more just societies. William James might ask: does believing in objective moral truth have cash value for social progress?

Beyond the False Dichotomy

The metaethical battlefield needn’t force us into rigid camps. The question isn’t simply whether objective moral truths exist independent of human minds, but what kind of objectivity morality might have.

Perhaps moral truths aren’t like physical facts but aren’t merely subjective either. They might be intersubjective—dependent on minds generally but not on any particular mind. They might be constructed through social practices but still maintain a kind of objectivity within those practices.

What’s clear is that dismissing morality as “merely subjective” provides comfort to those who benefit from unjust systems. When the powerful tell us morality is just opinion, we should be suspicious. Their theoretical anti-realism conveniently undermines criticism of their privilege.

The battle between moral realists and anti-realists reminds us of a crucial truth: philosophy matters. The way we understand the nature of moral discourse shapes how we approach moral disagreement and how we justify demands for justice. In a world rife with inequality and injustice, can we afford to be confused about what we mean when we say “This is wrong”?

Bob Lynn | © 2025 Vox Meditantis. All rights reserved.

Photo by Philip White on Unsplash

References:
[1] Metaethics | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
[2] Moral Realism – A Level Philosophy AQA Revision – Study Rocket
[3] Moral Anti-Realism – EA Forum
[4] Mackie’s Arguments for the Moral Error Theory
[5] [PDF] Metaethical Expressivism – Elisabeth Camp
[6] Universal prescriptivism – Wikipedia
[7] Ethical naturalism | Philosophy & Moral Realism – Britannica
[8] Ethical non-naturalism – Wikipedia
[9] Open-question argument – Wikipedia
[10] Metaethics – Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
[11] Error Theory – J.L. Mackie Argues that All Moral Judgments are False
[12] Ethical naturalism – Wikipedia
[13] Metaethics – Philosophy A Level
[14] Moral Error Theory – 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology
[15] Metaethics – Wikipedia
[16] [PDF] Not Just Errors: A New Interpretation of Mackie’s Error Theory
[17] An introduction/overview of Metaethics : r/philosophy – Reddit
[18] Moral Skepticism – Error Theory (J.L Mackie) – YouTube
[19] [PDF] An Introduction to Metaethics – PhilArchive
[20] [PDF] Error Theory After J.L Mackie – Oxford Brookes University
[21] Moral realism – Wikipedia
[22] 3.1.4: Realism versus Anti-Realism – Humanities LibreTexts
[23] Expressivism – Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy
[24] Prescriptivism | Descriptivism, Linguistic Norms & Grammar Rules
[25] Outline and Explain Moore’s Open Question Argument (9 marks)
[26] Moral Naturalism – Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
[27] Ethics Naturalism AO1 – WJEC
[28] Moral Naturalism : r/askphilosophy – Reddit
[29] What is the difference between ethical naturalism and non …